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Abstract
Abuse of  power is one of  classic concepts in administrative law. According to the classical approach, this 
concept is based on the assumption that the scope of  discretion of  public administration bodies is defined, 
beside competence norms, procedural and legal grounds for action, also by the objective for which the discretio-
nary powers was granted. The classic concept has evolved over the years. It is also evident that its importance 
has been in decline nowadays. The priority objectives of  my study concerned more practical than theoretical 
aspects of  the topic. The key issue of  my work is to analyze how courts have changed their approach to the 
judicial review of  the discretionary powers of  public administration. I set myself  two goals in this study: 
first, I would like to indicate the fundamental direction in which the classic concept of  abuse of  power evolves. 
Secondly, I would like to describe the contemporary role of  this concept and to response whether it can still 
be an effective instrument to protect an individual from arbitrary decisions of  the public administration.
Keywords
Discretionary Powers; Abuse of  Power; Principle of  Proportionality; Excess of  Power; Ultra Vires; 
Judicial Self-restraint.
Introduction: Public administration between 
binding and freedom of  action
The problem of  binding and freedom of  administration is one of  the most contentious 
issues of  administrative law (questio diabolica). It’s about finding a balance between two 
conflicting goals. On the one hand, the administration must have a certain scope of  free-
dom to carry out its tasks. On the other hand, excessive freedom granted to the admin-
istration can lead to violations of  the fundamental rights of  an individual.
The key element of  the guarantee of  individual freedom is judicial review of  public 
administration. Therefore, it is a matter of  dispute to which extent the public admin-
istration is subject to judicial review when performing the tasks entrusted. It is about 
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appropriate separation of  functions: the public administration is to implement the admi-
nistrative policy, while the role of  administrative courts is to review whether this func-
tion is correctly exercised under the legal provisions governing the activity of  the admin-
istration. The consequence of  separation of  these functions is that the judicial review 
is limited to the criterion of  legality and that the court’s function to directly correct 
administrative decisions is waived. Due to the separation of  functions, the court can-
not substitute the administrative body, and it cannot take a discretionary ruling instead 
of  the ruling the body has issued under its discretionary power1. The key question is who 
has the decisive voice, and who makes the final decision (Letztentscheidung)?2
The whole doctrine of  errors in discretionary powers, and the concept of  abuse of  dis-
cretionary powers constituting its element, is a way of  search for the right balance 
between the freedom of  action and the fact the administration is bound with law.
The key issue of  my work is to analyze how the courts have changed their approach 
to the judicial review of  discretionary powers of  public administration. The priority 
objectives of  my study concerned more practical than legal aspects of  the topic.
Due to the limited scope of  the article, I cannot make too much detailed considerations. 
For this reason, I focus on the model analysis: I try to point out some basic trends 
in case law. With this model, I focus on the analysis of  the basic evolutionary tenden-
cies in the legal systems I consider to be the most representative (German, French and 
English) because of  the impact they have had on case-law and scholarly opinion in other 
systems. For the same reasons, I give up the analysis of  the abuse of  powers in the 
sphere of  the use of  indefinite terms. It is a comprehensive issue, characterized by spe-
cific features and requiring a separate study.
1 The essence of  the problem – abuse as the application 
of  discretionary powers contrary to their intended purpose
The scholarly approach to the problem of  abuse of  discretionary powers in various legal 
systems is diverse. Regardless of  some differences, the essence of  the problem is similar 
in all legal systems. All the legal constructs based on the concept of  abuse of  discretio-
nary powers use a teleological element: the abuse is an authority’s error in the exercise 
of  discretion in a way inconsistent with the intended purpose this sphere of  freedom 
of  action was granted for. The purpose should be determined based on a teleological 
interpretation of  the competence norm.
1 German Federal Administrative Court: 9 Mai 1956 (III C 123.54, BVerwGE 3, 279); WOLFF, Hans J., 
Otto BACHOF and Rolf  STOBER. Verwaltungsrecht I. München: C. H. Beck, 1994, p. 378. ISBN 3-406-
08061-8; HÄFELIN, Ulrich and Georg MÜLLER. Grundriss des Allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts, Zürich: 
Schulthess, 1998, p. 93-94. ISBN 3-7255-3778-X; RODE, Lars-Henrik. § 40 VwVfG und die deutsche 
Ermessenslehre, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2003, pp. 95–98. ISBN 3-631-50308-3.
2 MAURER, Hartmut. Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht. München: C. H. Beck, 2011, p. 142. ISBN 
978-3-406-61452-1.
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All public administration activities are “teleologically determined”. In contrast to an indi-
vidual who can freely choose the purpose of  his or her actions, the public administra-
tion must pursue specific objectives set by public tasks. Each competence to act within 
discretionary power was entrusted by the legislature for the pursue of  specific objectives. 
This thesis is referred to as “purpose axiom”. It is the administrative body’s obligation 
to implement the purpose of  the act, the body may not pursue an objective other than 
set by the legislature. If  the body is guided by other reasons, or where it points to the 
alleged fulfilment of  the legitimate objective in order to hide the actual intentions, then 
its decision is unlawful, illegal3.
The EU administrative law also points out that the political freedom of  the EU institu-
tions is very much determined on a teleological basis, even more than it is for national 
authorities. For these reasons, EU bodies are not vested with overall, all-embracing 
powers, but specific powers. Secondly, these powers are strictly purpose bound4.
The purpose-bound character of  powers may form an important source of  their limita-
tion. On the other hand, there are certain factors that determine a very wide range of  dis-
cretionary powers of  the EU institutions. First of  all, objectives to be pursued by the 
EU institutions can not be too strictly defined as there is a need to find a broad politi-
cal compromise when negotiating and concluding the treaties. Secondly, sources of  the 
powers are mainly of  political nature, and this means that the EU institutions should 
themselves determine, within defined limits, the directions of  the policy to be pursued. 
Thirdly, a wide margin of  discretion is necessary due to the fact that the conditions 
in which these decisions are being made are enormously complex. The number of  fac-
tors to be taken into account by the EU institutions often exceeds the complexity of  the 
problems faced by national authorities. Consequently, judicial review is similar to the 
review of  reasonableness (German: Vertretbarkeit) of  a discretionary decision5.
The EU courts have pointed out that Community institutions enjoy a margin of  dis-
cretion in the choice of  the means needed to carry out their policies under the treaties. 
This is particularly true for activities undertaken in the field of  the common organi-
zation of  the markets whose purpose involves constant adjustments to meet changes 
in the complex economic situation and to take into account an enormous spectrum 
3 CRAIG, Paul. Administrative Law. 7. ed. London: Thomson, 2012, p. 568. ISBN 978-0-414-0229907; 
BRINKTRINE, Ralf. Verwaltungsermessen in Deutschland und England. Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1997, 
p. 379. ISBN 3-8114-8398-6.
4 BEBR, Gerhardt. Development of  Judicial Control of  the European Communities. The Hague-Boston-London: 
Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 1981, p. 117. ISBN 978-90-24-7254-10.
5 Von DANWITZ, Thomas. Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht. Heidelberg: Springer, 2008, p. 370. ISBN 978-3-
540-79877-4; KLATT, Matthias a Johannes SCHMIDT. Spielräume im öffentlichen Recht: zur Abwägungslehre 
der Prinzipientheorie. Tübingen 2010, pp. 97–99. ISBN 978-3-16-150564-5.
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of  divergent interests6. The judicial review of  such an appraisal must therefore be lim-
ited to verifying whether the procedural rules have been complied with, whether the 
facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, and whether 
there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of  those facts or a misuse of  powers7. 
Pursuant to 263(2) TFEU, misuse of  powers is one of  the conditions for judicial review 
of  the legality of  legal acts adopted by EU bodies. As Gerhardt Bebr put it, this is the most 
radical and the most perplexing of  all the grounds of  illegality of  an act8.
In a more general perspective, activities of  the administration must be driven by its pursue 
of  the general interest (French: intérêt général). Looking from a more detailed perspective: legal 
regulations assign particular objectives to specific powers9. Legal regulations may define the 
objectives of  administration activities in a negative way: by ruling out their implementation 
(any act taken by an official to pursue his or her personal interest, intérêt personel, is defective), 
or in a positive way, by assigning specific objectives to specific powers. Any activity aimed 
at achieving an objective other than that specified in detail by the Act will be defective10.
Abuse of  power in the classical approach involves the failure to comply with the above rules. 
It is a defect of  an administrative act consisting in that the body exercised its competences 
to pursue an objective different from the one for which those powers were granted. In other 
words, misuse of  power involves infringe the purpose of  the powers granted to the body11.
6 European Court of  Justice: 28 October 1982, 52/81, Faust, ECLI:EU:C:1982:369, § 27; 5 October 
1994, C-133/93, C-300/93 & C-362/93, Crispoltoni, ECLI:EU:C:1994:364, § 57; 29 February 1996, 
C-296/93 & C-307/93, French Republic and Ireland v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1996:65, § 59. Court 
of  First Instance: 20 March 2001, T-52/99, T.Port, ECLI:EU:T:2001:97, § 94; 10 February 2004, 
T-64/01 & T-65/01, Afrikanische Frucht Compagnie, ECLI:EU:T:2004:37, § 83-84.
7 European Court of  Justice: 27 September 2007, C-351/04, Ikea Wholesale, ECLI:EU:C:2007:547, 
§ 40, 41; 16 February 2012, C-191/09 P & C-200/09 P, Commission v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe 
NTRP, ECLI:EU:C:2009:454, § 63; 4 September 2014, C-21/13, Simon, Evers & Co GmbH v Hauptzollamt 
Hamburg-Hafen, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2154, § 29.
8 BEBR, op. cit., p. 117.
9 DUBOUIS, Louis. La théorie de l’abus de droit et la jurisprudence administrative. Paris: LGDJ, 1962, p. 299; 
WALINE, Jean. Droit administratif. Paris: Dalloz, 2008, p. 606. ISBN 978-2-247-07913-1; GAUDEMET, 
Yves. Traité de droit administratif. Paris: L.G.D.J., 2001, p. 496. ISBN 978-2-275-02075-6.
10 DUPUIS, Georges, Marie-Jose GUÉDON a Patrice CHRÉTIEN. Droit administratif. Paris: Dalloz, 2009, 
pp. 494–495. ISBN 978-2-247-08059-5.
11 DUBOUIS, op. cit., pp. 29, 31; VIDAL, R. L’evolution du détournement de pouvoir dans la jurisprudence 
administrative. Revue de Droit Public, 1952, no. 2, p. 275; CHAPUS, René. Droit administratif  général. Tome I. 
Paris: Motchrestien, 2001, p. 1048. ISBN 978-2-7076-1266-9; GAUDEMET, op. cit., p. 495; WALINE, 
op. cit., p. 606. Similarly in the Belgian law: BATSELÉ, Didier, Tony MORTIER and Martine SCAR-
CEZ. Manuel de droit administratif. Bruxelles: Bruyllant, 2010, p. 851. ISBN 978-2-8027-2881-8; Dutch 
law SEERDEN, Rene and Fritz STROINK. Administrative law in the Netherlands. In: SEERDEN, 
Rene and Fritz STROINK. Administrative law of  the European Union, its member states and the United States: 
a comparative analysis. Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002, pp. 168–169. ISBN 90-5095-251-8); Spanish law (desvi-
acion de poder) RETORTILLO BAQUER, Sebastian M. La desviación de poder en el derecho español. 
Revista de administración pública, 1957, no. 22, pp. 129–130; CLAVERO ARÉVALO, Manuel F. La desvi-
ación de poder en la reciente jurisprudencia del tribunal supremo. Revista de administración pública, 1959, 
no. 30, pp. 105–107; Italian law (sviamento di potere) CASSESE, Sabino. Istituzioni di diritto amministrativo. 
Milano: Giuffré Ed., 2004, p. 265.
457Jerzy Parchomiuk – Abuse of  Discretionary Powers in Administrative Law...
This comprises two groups of  cases. The first one concerns the intention to achieve 
an objective out of  the public interest, expressed in actions dictated by private motives 
(préoccupations d’ordre privé)12. The illegality of  activities of  the body, which fails to comply 
with the basic directive of  acting in the public interest and is motivated by private motives, 
is manifest. French scholars of  law provide a whole range of  case law examples illustrating 
this type of  abuse of  powers: the mayor (mer) has dismissed the police officer who opened 
an investigation due to a violation of  the provisions on the sale of  alcoholic beverages 
against a shopkeeper who is a relative of  mayor; the mayor has used his police compe-
tences to limit the operation of  the dance hall that competes with his alcohol store; the 
authority has introduced a traffic ban in front of  the private house in order to satisfy its 
owner; the mayor has issued an order to move the municipal marketplace to another place 
where merchants from other towns had limited parking options, the order was officially 
motivated to improve traffic, whereas in essence it was about the protection of  local mer-
chants, who bought permanent places in the marketplace; the cases of  transfer to another 
post or dismissal of  officials due to political motives; deliberate prolongation and interrup-
tion of  the city council deliberations to delay the construction of  the TGV rail section.13.
The second group of  cases is more subtle. It comprises situations when the objective 
pursued by the public administration remains in the sphere of  public interest, but it is not 
an objective assigned in the act to this powers. In other words, while issuing the act, the 
body acted in the public interest, but other than that which was supposed to be pursued 
pursuant to the law14. A specific example is the use of  police and administrative powers 
not to enforce public order, but in the fiscal interest of  the state or a municipality.
An illustration can be the classic judgements of  the French Council of  State (Conseild’Etat) 
of  November 26, 1875, in cases Pariset and Laumonnier-Carriol, in which the Court has 
used the concept of  détournement de pouvoir for the first time. The Act of  August 2, 1872, 
made the expropriation of  match factories, which became hence the subject of  the 
monopoly of  the state. The Act also provided compensation for expropriated entre-
preneurs. To reduce the amount of  these damages, the finance minister ordered the 
prefects to close some factories directly on the pretext that their activities are incompat-
ible with the provisions on hazardous, arduous or polluting plants. The Council of  State 
declared the prefects’ orders invalid, considering that they had applied their police 
powers to achieve a goal other than that for which they were entrusted15.
12 CHAPUS, op. cit., p. 1049; DUPUIS, GUÉDON, CHRÉTIEN, op. cit., p. 655; LOMBARD, Martine and 
Gilles DUMONT. Droit administratif. Paris: Dalloz, 2007, p. 483. ISBN 978-2-247-07526-3; WALINE, op. 
cit., p. 606.
13 Cited in: CHAPUS, op. cit., p. 1049, WALINE, op. cit., p. 606.
14 DUBOUIS, op. cit., p. 31; WALINE, op. cit., p. 607; CHAPUS, op. cit., p. 1051; LOMBARD, DUMONT, 
op. cit., p. 483.
15 Cited in: WALINE, op. cit., p. 607; CHAPUS, op. cit., p. 1052.
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Similar ideas lay at the heart of  the classic German concept of  external and internal 
limits of  discretionary powers. The external limits set the area beyond which the public 
administration remains closely bound by law. They are composed of  norms defining 
powers, procedure and substantive legal conditions for action. Within this area, there 
are further limits delineated by objectives for which the freedom of  action was granted 
to body. These boundaries define the permitted or forbidden motives for the action 
of  the public administration. Accordingly, the body’s error may consist in crossing the 
external borders, which is referred to as exceeding discretionary powers (Ermessensüber-
schreitung) or may involve crossing the internal borders, referred to as abuse of  discretio-
nary powers (Ermessensmiβbrauch)16.
The evolution of  judicial review of  administrative discretionary powers was aimed 
at extending the scope of  control by courts. Initially, it was considered that judicial review 
could only cover the excess of  external borders, since discretionary acts (freies Ermessen) 
were not subject to judicial review17. With time it has been noticed, however, that statutory 
norms may not be violated also in the case of  exercise of  discretionary powers. As a result, 
the administrative court should review the compliance by the authority with both external 
and internal limits of  the exercise of  discretionary powers18. These classical considerations 
are reflected in contemporary regulations defining the administrative court jurisdiction 
in terms of  verification of  the legality of  administrative activity19.
The key legal factor which determines the exercise of  discretionary powers is the obliga-
tion to comply with the objectives of  statutory authorisation. This is also related to the 
requirement to issue discretionary decisions on the basis of  a factual point of  view and 
after a comprehensive balancing of  the public interest and individual interests20. This 
may be illustrated by the judgment of  the German Bundesverwaltungsgericht of  January 
31, 1967, which indicated that in the case of  a public assembly it would be an action 
deprived of  substantive grounds, and hence unlawful, if  the order to dissolve the assem-
bly was dictated by the desire to prevent a public expression of  a certain worldview 
or political views21.
16 Von LAUN, Rudolf. Das freie Ermessen. Lepizig-Wien: Deuticke, 1910, pp. 114–117.
17 Von LAUN, op. cit., pp. 219–220.
18 FLEINER, Fritz. Institutionen des Deutschen Verwaltungsrecht. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1928, pp. 133–134.
19 See: § 114.1 German Code of  Administrative Court Procedure (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung, VwGO): 
“Soweit die Verwaltungsbehörde ermächtigt ist, nach ihrem Ermessen zu handeln, prüft das Gericht auch, ob der Ver-
waltungsakt oder die Ablehnung oder Unterlassung des Verwaltungsakts rechtswidrig ist, weil die gesetzlichen Grenzen 
des Ermessens überschritten sind oder von dem Ermessen in einer dem Zweck der Ermächtigung nicht entsprechenden 
Weise Gebrauch gemacht ist”. See also: § 40 of  German Administrative Procedure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, 
VwVfG) of  25 May 1976: “Ist die Behörde ermächtigt, nach ihrem Ermessen zu handeln, hat sie ihr Ermessen entspre-
chend dem Zweck der Ermächtigung auszuüben und die gesetzlichen Grenzen des Ermessens einzuhalten”.
20 WOLFF, BACHOF, STOBER, op. cit., p. 377; RODE, op. cit., p. 89.
21 BVerwGE 26,135,140.
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In general terms, abuse of  discretionary powers means an infringement of  these require-
ments. The body abuses his powers when it pursues other objectives than those for which 
it has been granted discretionary powers, and it does not take into account the inten-
tions of  the lawmakers. The term of  abuse also includes cases of  non-legal (personal 
or political) motives that are not included in the criteria resulting from the objectives 
for which the body was granted discretionary power22. For example, as indicated by the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht in the judgment of  January 19, 2005, in the selection of  persons 
who will be appointed for military service, the conscription bodies have discretionary 
powers. The bodies are guided primarily by public interest, expressed in the demand for 
conscripts, and not the private interest of  persons subject to the obligation to serve. 
The person covered by the appointment may not defend himself  with the argument 
that other persons subject to the obligation have not been appointed. However, a per-
son subject to military service has the right to demand that the authority decide to put 
him into service in a manner free from arbitrariness, i.e. without following any irrelevant 
motives or intending to harm him. In this case, not only abuse of  powers entrusted 
to the authority takes place, but also interference in the protected rights of  the conscript. 
No citizen in the rule of  law state can put up with the arbitrary decision of  the author-
ity deliberately aimed at violating his rights. In such situations, the citizen has the right 
to demand the repeal of  this type of  decision or its harmful effects23.
The classical English administrative law and case law have dealt with the problem 
of  abuse of  power in a similar way.
The conceptual category of  abuse of  discretionary powers in common-law culture terms 
is much more voluminous than in continental approaches. The key is not whether the 
body went beyond the boundaries delineated by the statutory authorisation. It is more 
the question, whether sovereign powers using by the body were not misused or insuffi-
ciently grounded. Thus, the court enters the area of  review of  the merits and substance 
of  the decision and the grounds for it24.
The traditional basis of  judicial review of  administrative activities is the doctrine of  ultra 
vires, which in brief  means that a body is prohibited to act outside jurisdiction, which 
22 MAURER, op. cit., pp. 149–150; RODE, op. cit., pp. 90–92, 99.
23 BVerwGE 122, 311, 315: “Der Wehrpflichtige braucht aber nicht jede Auswahlentscheidung der Behörde ohne die 
Möglichkeit der Gegenwehr hinzunehmen. Namentlich kann er verlangen, dass die Behörde über seine Heranziehung 
oder Nichtheranziehung zum Wehrdienst frei von Willkür, d.h. ohne die Absicht entscheidet, ihn in sachwidriger Weise 
zu benachteiligen. In einem derartigen Fall liegt nicht nur ein Missbrauch des der Behörde eingeräumten Ermessens und 
damit eine Verletzung von objektivem Recht, sondern darüber hinaus auch ein Übergriff  in die verfassungsrechtlich 
geschützte Individualrechtssphäre des Wehrpflichtigen vor, die dieser abzuwehren berechtigt ist. Denn kein Bürger braucht 
im Rechtsstaat eine ihn gezielt benachteiligende Willkürentscheidung der Behörde zu dulden; vielmehr kann er unter Beru-
fung auf  das jeweils berührte Grundrecht die Aufhebung dieser Entscheidung oder ihrer benachteiligenden Wirkungen 
erreichen”.
24 Por. WOOLF, JOWELL, LE SUEUR, op. cit., p. 544.
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is the key feature of  the entire administrative law. Exceeding the limits of  the powers 
by the administrative body may be expressed in three classic forms: excess of  power, 
abuse of  power and violation of  procedural rules25.
The concept of  ultra vires is based on the assumption that the legislature grants discretio-
nary powers with a certain objective to be pursued. Using discretionary powers in a way 
inconsistent with the will of  the legislature is an unlawful act26. In other words, the 
authority exceeds its powers when it does not comply with the limits of  the discretion 
margin granted to it, referred to expressis verbis or implicitly in the statutory authorisation.
The most characteristic weaknesses as to the purpose are cases in which the body acted 
for political reasons, which have no connection with the legal fundament of  the com-
petence. An example is the case R. v. Ealing London Borough Council, ex parte Times News-
paper Group of  198727. According to the Public Libraries and Museums Act of  1964, the 
Ealing district council in London was committed to providing a comprehensive and 
effective library service to all interested users. In implementing this broad and quite 
vaguely defined obligation, which gives the body a wide sphere of  decision-making flexi-
bility, the body should also take into account the needs of  users. When there was a long-
standing labor dispute between the Times publishing group and trade unions, dominated 
by the labor party members, the Council decided to remove all magazines of  this pub-
lishing group from the offer of  the library as part of  solidarity with the strikers. The 
Times group questioned effectively this “excommunication” before the court.The Court 
considered that the decision of  the Council was motivated by the desire to support 
the workers’ fight against the tyranny of  the employer and to punish the latter for his 
actions by excluding from the offer his magazines. In this way, the Council interfered 
in the labor dispute, and this political motif  has nothing to do with the purpose of  the 
provisions of  the Public Libraries Act, which constitute a source of  power to act under 
discretionary powers.
Another example of  the use of  discretionary powers to achieve a wrong purpose may 
be the Magill v. Porter case28, in which the conservative leaders of  the Westminster City 
Council used their powers to make decisions in the field of  municipal housing economy, 
to increase the number of  apartments for persons under court guardianship to encour-
age them to vote for the conservative party in future elections. The District Auditor 
questioned the legality of  these activities, and the House of  Lords upheld his decision. 
The Lords indicated that although the Council’s competence in the field of  using muni-
cipal real estate is very wide and although elected politicians are entitled to act in a way 
25 WADE, William and Christopher FORSYTH. Administrative Law. 9. ed. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004, pp. 35–36. ISBN 0-19-926995-5.
26 CRAIG, 2012, op. cit., p. 5.
27 High Court (Queens Bench Division): 6 November 1987; (1987) 85 L.G.R. 316.
28 House of  Lords: 13 December 2001; [2001] UKHL 67.
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that can be supported by the electorate, they can only act to achieve public goals for 
which they have been entrusted with the imperative powers. Powers conferred on a local 
authority may not lawfully be exercised to promote the electoral advantage of  a political 
party.
In the case R. v. Lewisham London Borough Council, ex parte Shell U.K. Ltd.29, the London 
City Council, pursuing its generally defined obligation to improve relations between the 
communities inhabiting the commune, resulting from the Race Relations Act of  1976, 
decided not to buy Shell products. The boycott was meant to influence the global con-
cern to end its economic activity in South Africa (due to the apartheid issue in the coun-
try). The court repealed the act, stressing that maintaining trade relations with South 
Africa is not illegal, so an attempt to influence the concern by boycotting its products 
meant striving to achieve an unlawful goal.
Courts derive the non-defined limits of  administrative powers from certain basic stan-
dards of  using discretionary powers. The discretionary powers should be exercised rea-
sonably and in good faith, only the relevant factors in the case should be taken into 
account, it is unacceptable to compromise in any way entrusted functions, the decision 
cannot be arbitrary or constitute a caprice of  the authorities30.
One of  examples of  arbitrary criteria used by the body is the decision in the Wheeler 
v. Leicester City Council case31, where the municipality refused to provide the rugby club 
with communal sports facilities for the reason that the club members did not support 
the political position represented by the majority in the municipal council, which was 
expressed in taking part in the rugby competition in South Africa during the apartheid 
period.
Another example is the case of  R. v. Port Talbot Borough Council, ex parte Jones32, in which 
the decision to postpone the request for granting social housing from urban resources 
by giving priority to an application at the bottom of  the list, was considered unlawful, 
because it was supported by arbitrary criteria. The motivation for changing the order 
of  applications was the intention of  the decision maker to increase their chances in the 
upcoming elections by supporting certain people.
29 High Court (Queens Bench Division): 21 October 1987; [1988] 1 All E.R. 938.
30 WADE, FORSYTH, op. cit., p. 350. See also a statement by Lord Denning in Case Breen v. Amalgamated 
Engineering Union: “The discretion of  a statutory body is never unfettered. It is a discretion which is to be exercised accord-
ing to law. That means at least this: the statutory body must be guided by relevant cosiderations and not by irrelevant. If  its 
decision is influenced by extraneous cosiderations which it ought not to have taken into account, then the decision cannot 
stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted in good faith; nevertheless the desion will be sey aside” (Ibid., 
p. 358).
31 House of  Lords: 25 July 1985, [1985] UKHL 6.
32 High Court (Queens Bench Division): 2 January 1988; ([1988] 2 All E.R. 207 (214).
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The concepts developed under national legal systems have influenced to the premises 
of  abuse of  power in the EU courts case law in view of  Article 263(2) TFEU and earlier 
treaty regulations indicating the conditions for the annulment of  an act of  an EU insti-
tution33. According to the general definition developed in the case-law, abuse of  powers 
occurs when it can be stated on the basis of  objective, relevant and consistent factors 
that the act was adopted by the EU institution with the exclusive purpose, or at any rate 
the main purpose, of  achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure 
specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of  the case34.
2 Abuse of  discretionary powers and “administrative morality”
The concept of  abuse of  right is strongly characterised by axiology. It is connected with 
the negative assessment of  the entity using a right in a manner inconsistent with com-
monly accepted social values that form the basis for the axiology of  the entire legal 
system. Abuse of  right means an action that is negatively assessed not only in the legal 
perspective but also in the moral perspective.
As I have already mentioned, the classical approach of  the concept of  abuse of  dis-
cretionary powers involves subjective evaluation criteria referring to the mental states 
of  an official, i.e. bad faith or personal motives.
33 BEBR, op. cit., p. 117; CRAIG, Paul. EU Administrative Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, 
p. 462. ISBN 978-0-19-929680-4; TOTH, Alexander. The Oxford Encyclopedia of  European Community 
Law. Oxford 2005, pp. 368–369. ISBN 978-01-98256-007; CLEVER, Friedrich. Ermessensmiβbrauch und 
détournement de pouvoir nach dem Recht des Europäischen Gemeinschaften im Licht der Rechtsprechung ihres Gerichtsho-
fes. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1967, pp. 15–17.
34 European Court of  Justice: 21 December 1954, 1/54, French Republic v High Authority of  the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community, ECLI:EU:C:1954:7; 4 February 1982, 817/79, Buyl and Others v Commi-
ssion, ECLI:EU:C:1982:36, § 28; 13 November 1990, C-331/88, Fedesa, ECLI:EU:C:1990:391, § 24; 
12 November 1996, C-84/94, United Kingdom v Council, ECLI:EU:C:1996:431, § 69; 25 June 1997, 
C-285/94, Italy v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1997:313, § 52; 5 Mai 1998, C-180/96, United Kingdom 
v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1998:192, § 52; 14 Mai 1998, C-48/96 P, Windpark Groothusen v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:223, § 52; 22 November 2001, C-110/97, Netherlands v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2001:620, 
§ 137; 10 Mai 2005, C-400/99, Italy v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2005:275, § 38; 10 March 2005, 
C-342/03, Spain v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2005:151, § 64; 7 September 2006, C-310/04, Spain v Council, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:521, § 69. Court of  First Instance: 6 April 1995, T-143/89, Ferriere Nord v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:1995:64, pkt 68; 14. 11. 2002, T-332/00 i T-350/00, Rica Foods & Free Trade Foods v Commi-
ssion, ECLI:EU:T:2002:274, § 200.
TOTH, op. cit., p. 369; CRAIG, Paul and Gráinne de BÚRCA. EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 536. ISBN 0-19-924943-1; LÉGER, Paul. Commentaire article par article 
des traités UE et CE. Bâle-Genève-Münich: Helbig & Lichtenhahn, 2000, p. 700. ISBN 3-7190-1815-6; 
Van RAEPENBUSCH, Sean. Droit institutionnel de l’Union et des Communautés européennes. Bruxelles: Larcier, 
2001, p. 509. ISBN 978-2-8044-7818-6; SCHERMERS, Henry. Judicial Protection in the European Communi-
ties. The Hague: Kluwer Law Int., 2001, p. 191. ISBN 90-411-16311.
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In the first half  of  the twentieth century the concept of  détournement de pouvoir was at the 
peak of  its “popularity”. At that time Maurice Hauriou35 and Henri Welter36 claimed that 
this is a key element of  control of  administrative morality of  administration (moralité 
administratif). This concept assumed that judicial review did not only concern the formal 
compliance of  administrative activities with the law, but also was intended to serve the 
interest of  good administration (l’intérêt d’une bonne administration), that is one that respects 
the rights of  individuals and effectively performs public service tasks.
The concept of  “administrative morality” changed the significance of  the criteria 
to assess activities of  the administration. It is difficult to consider such concepts in pure 
categories of  compliance with the law. “Administrative morality” refers rather to admi-
nistrative deontology and the reasonableness of  activities of  the body. If  an official uses 
his powers for private purposes or for other purposes contrary to the public interest, 
he abuses the functions entrusted to him. Such behaviour deserves not only to be mor-
ally deplored but has also legal consequences. Therefore, the negative assessment of  the 
official’s action must also be reflected in the judgement of  the administrative court, 
which should repeal an act that violates the requirements of  “administrative morality”37.
Similar elements can be seen in classical English administrative law, where “bad 
faith” is listed as a traditional basis for repealing the act because of  abuse of  discre-
tionary powers. In the strict sense, this includes cases of  deliberate abuse of  discre-
tion, as opposed to a situation where the body misuses discretion, but does it as a result 
of  ignorance or misunderstanding of  the intent of  the legislature. To be classified as bad 
faith, the deed concerned must be an intentional dishonest action. This includes inten-
tional damage, fraudulent manipulation, dishonesty, malice and other deliberate infringe-
ments38. Typical symptoms of  bad faith are cases of  deliberate favouritism or dismissal 
of  claims of  applicants due to personal liking or antipathy. There are also detrimental 
activities motivated by the desire for revenge.
An example of  this may be the judgement in the case R. v. Derbyshire County Council, 
ex parte The Times Supplements Limited39, issued on the basis of  the following facts: after 
The Sunday Times published numerous critical articles about influential members of  local 
educational authorities, the educational administration authority decided to publish job 
vacancies for teachers not in the educational supplement of  The Times, but in Guardian, 
despite The Times had a much wider distribution range and so far there were no objec-
tions to cooperation. Because the body could not determine the basis for its decision, 
35 As expressed in his classic coursebook: Droit administratif. Paris, 1897.
36 WELTER, Henri. Le côntrole juridictionnel de la moralité administrative. Paris: Sirey, 1929, passim.
37 DUBOUIS, op. cit., pp. 192–193.
38 CRAIG, 2012, op. cit., p. 576; BRINKTRINE, op. cit., pp. 399–400; WOOLF, JOWELL, Le SUEUR, 
op. cit., pp. 266–267; WADE, FORSYTH, op. cit., p. 416.
39 High Court (Queens Bench Division): 18 July 1990, [1991] 3 Admin. L.R. 241.
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which would indicate a reference to the field of  education or provide other convincing 
arguments for its decision, the court concluded that the change for another newspaper 
was caused only by bad faith, a desire for personal revenge, punishing the journal pub-
lisher for critical publications.
„Administrative morality” as a criterion of  review induces the search for subjective, 
underlying intentions of  an official: bad faith, personal animosities, private motives. The 
result is difficulties in the practical application of  the concept of  abuse of  power.
Intentions of  an official who issues an administrative act form the psychological element, 
which is difficult to detect. The only exception is when the author expresses his intentions 
openly, but this is of  course rare for administrative acts40. In this situation, difficulties with 
evidence finding are inevitable, especially considering the general principle that the com-
plainant bears the burden of  proof  as to the unlawfulness of  the act41.
The difficulties with evidence finding become even deeper if  we take into account the 
specific manner of  activity of  the public administration. It is a mechanism whose indi-
vidual cogs are virtually unnoticeable to an external observer. The specific character 
of  such organism as the public administration hinders the search for subjective motiva-
tions related to the activities of  specific officials.
The very criterion of  administrative morality was not very transparent also. It forced the 
reference to criteria not expressed directly in normative acts, and in addition it meant 
constant balancing at the limits of  what was allowed and what was forbidden. Abuse 
of  power rarely concerned cases of  manifest, apparent bad will and motivation deserv-
ing not only moral but also legal reproach. Most of  judgements were issued in border-
line and open situations, providing the possibility of  different assessment.
As a result, while applicants often raised the allegation of  abuse of  power, the num-
ber of  judgements in which administrative courts reached for this instrument have 
decreased significantly with time. This process induced some authors to express the 
opinion of  decline (déclin) or marginalisation of détournement de pouvoir 42.
40 GROS, Manuel. Fonctions manifestes et latentes du détournement de pouvoir. Revue de Droit Public, 
1997, no. 9–10, pp. 1238–1239; LEMASURIER, Jean. La prevue dans le détournement de pouvoir. Revue 
de Droit Public, 1959, no. 1, pp. 59–60.
41 Conseil d’Etat: 26 January 1968, Societé “Maison Génestal”, as cited in: LACHAUME, Jean-François and 
Hélène PAULIAT. Droit administratif  (Les grandes decisions de la jurisprudence). Paris, 2007, pp. 744–745. 
ISBN 978-213-0556503.
42 De FORGES, op. cit., p. 279; FERNANDEZ-MAUBLANC, Lucienne-Victoire. Le prétendu déclin 
du détournement de pouvoir. In: Mélanges offerts à Jean-Marie Auby. Paris: Dalloz, 1992, p. 239. ISBN 978-22-
470-1353-1. The Belgian administrative law’s literature provides similar reasons for the very rare use of  the 
power abuse concept by the Belgian Council of  State (BATSELÉ, MORTIER, SCARCEZ, op. cit., p. 851).
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3 Evolution of  classic concepts of  abuse of  discretionary 
powers in case law and scholarly opinion.
3.1 Difficulties in evidence finding and the objectivity of  assessment criteria
The classic approach to the abuse of  discretionary powers, which stressed the need 
to discover the actual intentions and bad faith of  the official concerned, significantly 
weakened the practical effectiveness of  this construct as a means of  judicial review 
of  public administration. Attempts to solve this problem went in various directions.
On the one hand, there has been a tendency to objectify the criteria for assessing the 
functioning of  the body under the concept of  abuse.
One of  the flaws of  the classic approach to abuse of  power was difficulties with evi-
dence finding. The complainant bringing the claim to court had to demonstrate the offi-
cial’s negative intentions. The presumption of  abuse of  power was definitely ruled out43. 
Due to the aforementioned specificity of  administrative activities, which “is revealed” 
to the individual only in the form of  an administrative act, it could be impossible to prove 
bad faith or negative personal motives of  the official.
The case law has evolved towards a gradual loosening of  the evidence requirements44. 
Despite the complainant-friendly tendency in the settled case law, abuse of  power is dif-
ficult to prove. Administrative courts work on material in the form of  documents, they 
are not willing to conduct a meticulous “investigation” on their own to discover actual 
motives of  the officials. Testimonies given by officials at hearings have a weak evidential 
value because they, as representatives of  the party to the dispute, can only be subject 
to an information hearing and not a hearing as witnesses45.
Similar tendencies are also seen in the EU case law. The jurisprudence assumes that 
the EU institutions apply a kind of  “presumption of  innocence”. It is assumed that 
by undertaking actions they aimed at achieving legitimate goals unless it is proven other-
wise. As a result, it is the appellant’s role to provide objective evidence that the EU insti-
tution has misused its powers. Intentions and motives behind actions taken by EU insti-
tutions require proof, which is difficult to provide, in particular for private entities that 
may not have access to the relevant documents. The ECJ takes into account the allega-
tion of  abuse of  power only when there are objective, relevant and consistent indica-
tions that the act was adopted to pursue an end other than that which should be lawfully 
pursued46.
43 GROS, op. cit., p. 1239.
44 LEMASURIER, op. cit., pp. 60–65.
45 GROS, op. cit., p. 1239.
46 CRAIG, 2006, op. cit., p. 462; CLEVER, op. cit., p. 13; TOTH, op. cit., p. 370.
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To determine that there was an abuse of  power in the case one needs first to discover 
the real intentions of  the institution, that is, the objectives it pursued by undertaking 
the act in question. It is then necessary to demonstrate that this objective differs from 
that which the institution should or could have legitimately pursue in the circumstances 
in which it acted. In this respect, the evolution of  the EU courts’ approach towards 
objectivity of  criterion is noticeable. Originally, it was assumed that the only criterion 
for the examination is the intention of  the administrative body. In the meantime, there 
has been a reorientation towards the objective properties of  the act: an abuse of  powers 
occurs when, from an objective point of  view, the action aims at pursuing an unaccept-
able objective. The acceptable objective should be extracted from the authorizing norm 
on which the contested act was based, and from the general objectives of  the Treaty47.
3.2 Displacement of  abuse of  discretion by other grounds 
for the review of  discretionary powers of  the administration
The second direction of  the evolution of  scholarly and jurisprudential views led to the 
phenomenon of  a gradual displacement of  the concept of  abuse of  power by other 
grounds for judicial review, which allow achieving the same effect in the form of  repeal-
ing the act, and are based on more transparent criteria.
An example of  this process may be matters regarding the so-called nomination for the 
order (nominations pour ordre), i.e. appointment to positions in public administration (usu-
ally high-level), which do not entail actual performance of  the function, but only bene-
fits related to the position. A classic example is the Council’s of  State judgment of  Janu-
ary 8, 1971, in the case Association des magistrates et anciens magistrates de la Cour de Comptes48: 
the Council annulled the nomination act, considering it invalid and irrelevant, as it was 
demonstrated that the nomination procedure was not related to the existence of  a real 
vacancy, the nominated person never performed the functions entrusted to him, and the 
only goal was, on the one hand, to obtain the benefits envisaged by the law related to the 
nomination, on the other, to open the path to another post to which the appointed per-
son aspired. Another example, can be the judgement mentioned in the French media: 
Judgement of  Council of  State of  18 January 2013, regarding the appointment to the 
position of  Advocate General (avocat général) in the Court of  Cassation (Cour de Cassa-
tion) of  a person who at the time of  nomination was the director of  the office of  the 
Minister of  Justice and remained in that position despite the nomination, and therefore 
could not, and in fact did not perform the new function to which had been appointed49.
47 CRAIG, 2006, op. cit., p. 463; Van RAEPENBUSCH, op. cit., p. 509; VOCKE, Christian. Die Ermittlungs-
befugnisse der EG-Kommission im kartellrechtlichen Voruntersuchungsverfahren. Berlin: BWV Verlag, 2006, p. 53 
ISBN 978-38-305-1228-8; von DANWITZ, op. cit., p. 369.
48 Recueil Dalloz 1971, p. 26.
49 Available from: http://www.conseil-etat.fr/fr/base-de-jurisprudence/; case no. 354218.
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This is an obvious use of  powers contrary to their purpose, which indicates the construct 
of  détournement de pouvoir. However, administrative courts prefer to use another measure, 
more reliable and easier for evidentiary reasons, namely to declare the act non-existent 
(inexistence juridique) that is to declare it null and void (nul et non avenues, de nul effet)50.
An instrument used by the courts for this purpose are the general principles of  law, 
e.g. the principle of  equality. An example is the Council’s of  State judgment of  Mai 29, 
1954, in Barel case51: the complainant was removed from the list of  competition candi-
dates to the École nationale d’administration because of  the communist views he presented. 
The use of  competences in the selection of  candidates for school to remove a person 
whose political views the decision maker does not accept could be successfully classi-
fied as an abuse of  power. However, the Council did not use this argument but referred 
to the violation of  the principle of  equality, claiming that the equality of  all French 
people in access to public offices does not allow the deletion of  a candidate from the list 
only on the basis of  his political views.
A similar case, in which the concept of  abuse of  power was replaced by the violation 
of  the principle of  equality is the judgment of  the Council of  State of  30 June, 1989 
in the case Ville de Paris c. Levy52. In the case, the court questioned the legality of  the 
resolution of  the Conseil de Paris to the extent introducing the conditions of  nationality 
in the granting of  certain benefits in the field of  municipal assistance. Since the reason 
of  action was in fact the concern for the protection of  demographic balance in Paris, 
this could justify the charge of  abuse of  power, because these are not goals and reasons 
that can be implemented by actions in the area of  social welfare. However, the adminis-
trative courts expressly preferred to find a violation of  the principle of  equality in this 
case by differentiating between Parisians of  French and non-French nationalities.
Another example is the displacement of  classical concepts of  abuse of  discretion by the 
principle of  proportionality, having a similar structure, giving similar effects, but consid-
ered to be more transparent in application. Separate points will be provided hereinafter 
on this question.
3.3 Abuse of  power in other areas of  discretionary power of  the administration
The third direction of  the evolution of  views in the area of  judicial review of  discretio-
nary powers of  public administration resulted from the need to “complete” this review 
in a slightly different aspect. The risk of  the administration evading charges of  abuse 
of  power in a completely different direction was observed.
50 Por. GROS, op. cit., p. 1245.
51 The review of  the judgment is available from: http://www.conseil-etat.fr
52 Available from: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?idTexte=CETATEXT000007754407
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Judicial review covers only the legality of  an administrative act, its compliance with legal 
rules that determine the work of  the administration. If  such a legal rule allows the admi-
nistrative body to act freely, the body decides based on opportunity (opportunité). The 
administrative court does not review opportunity53.
As Georges Vedel notes, if  the administration operates within circumscribed powers, its 
activities can be assessed in terms of  their legality. The public administration can only 
decide to the extent allowed by law. Its act may, therefore, be compliant or non-compli-
ant with law. On the other hand, if  the administration has discretionary powers, its act 
can only be judged in terms of  reasonableness: the act may be opportune or not oppor-
tune, right or wrong, but it cannot be illegal until the administration has the freedom 
to act54.
Since the legislator grants the body freedom to assess, the court cannot examine it, 
because there are no criteria for assessing what are the rules determining the way the 
body acts. Consistently following this argument, it would entail allowing any arbitrariness 
of  the administration, and thus the possibility of  abuse the body’s discretion in the area 
of  assessing the factual basis of  the decision.
Therefore, constructs have been developed to prevent leaving the discretionary sphere 
of  administration activities out of  the scope of  judicial review. These include the con-
cept of  manifest error in assessment (erreur manifeste d’appréciation), balance control and 
the principle of  proportionality, which will be discussed further in this paper.
As Judge of  the Council of  State Guy Braibant55, pointed out, the construct of  manifest 
error in assessment is aimed at limiting abuses that may occur during exercise of  discre-
tionary powers. For this reason, it is similar to the construct of  détournement de pouvoir. The 
purpose of  the prohibition of  abuse of  power is to subject the public administration 
to minimum standards of  morality and prevent the use of  powers to pursue objectives 
inconsistent with the public interest. Similarly, the criterion of  manifest error in assess-
ment is to instruct administrative bodies to adhere to logic and common sense. Even 
where authorities have the powers to do what they think is right, they are not authorised 
to do anything (Même lorqu’elles ont le pouvoir de faire ce qu’elle veulent, elles ne doivent pas être 
autorisées à faire n’importe quoi).
The notion of  manifest error in assessment is specific, it contains a certain charge of  sub-
jectivity. Scholars describe it as an obvious error, which does not raise any doubt for 
a reasonable person (esprit éclairé), a serious, grave (grossiere), flagrant error. This refers 
53 SERRAND, Pierre. Le contrôle juridictionnel du pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’administration à travers 
la jurisprudence récente. Revue du droit public, 2012, no. 4, p. 906.
54 VEDEL, Georges and Pierre DELVOLVÉ. Droit adminitstratif, T. 1. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1992, p. 529. ISBN 978-213-04506-58.
55 In the commentary on the Council of  State’s judgement in case Lambert of  13 November 1970 (Actua-
lite Juridique: Droit Administratif, 1971, p. 35), as cited in: SERRAND, op. cit., p. 907.
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to a resolution that exceeds all norms of  rationality, an error which does not result from 
discretion but from arbitrariness (non pas discrétionnaire mais arbitraire)56.
An example may be the judgement of  the Council of  State of  December 16, 1988 in the 
Bléton case57, which involved appointing a person who did not have any professional 
experience or knowledge to take up such a position as a general inspector of  libraries. 
The Council stated that the regulations on the basis of  which the nomination was made 
contained only the age requirement, thus leaving the government a very wide margin 
of  discretion, however they did not exempt from the obligation to comply with the 
basic principle expressed in Article 6 of  the Declaration of  Human Rights, according 
to which all the citizens have equal access to all public dignities, positions and functions, 
depending on their aptitudes and with only the differences that arise from their virtues 
and talents (selon leur capacité et sans autre distinction que celle de leurs vertus et de leurs talents). 
The assessment of  candidate’s capacity for a function should take into account the scope 
of  tasks related to this function, indicating the need to have appropriate knowledge 
and professional experience. The circumstances of  the case indicated, that the minis-
ter would like to “reward” his colleague, so the facts in the case indicated that there 
had been abuse of  discretionary powers because the minister has misused his powers. 
Nevertheless, the Council repealed the act because of  a manifest error of  appreciation, 
without referring at all to the abuse of  powers.
The concept of  manifest error developed in the EU courts case law is of  similar 
character. Its source is the historical Article 33.1 of  the ECSC Treaty, which is a kind 
of  counterpart of  the current Article 263.2 TFEU58. The term “clearly misinterpreted 
the provisions of  the Treaty” used in that provision was interpreted in the ECJ case 
law as a significant misinterpretation or misapplication of  the provisions of  the Treaty 
resulting from a manifest error in assessment of  the economic situation in the light 
of  the circumstances in which the act under review was issued. The ground of  mani-
fest error was to make it possible for the Court to review the Commission’s assessment 
of  the situation in which it issued the contested act, to examine whether the act was 
manifestly unfounded59.
56 CHAPUS, op. cit., p. 1066; GAUDEMET, op. cit., p. 502; GROS, op. cit., p. 1250; SERRAND, op. cit., 
pp. 907–908.
57 Cited by: GROS, op. cit., p. 1250.
58 According to this provision, the Court shall have jurisdiction over appeals by a member State or by the 
Council for the annulment of  decisions and recommendations of  the High Authority on the grounds 
of  lack of  legal competence, substantial procedural violations, violation of  the Treaty or of  any rule 
of  law relating to its application, or abuse of  power. However, the Court may not review the conclusi-
ons of  the High Authority, drawn from economic facts and circumstances, which formed the basis 
of  such decisions or recommendations, except where the High Authority is alleged to have abused its 
powers or to have clearly misinterpreted the provisions of  the Treaty or of  a rule of  law relating to its 
application.
59 TOTH, op. cit., p. 368.
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The concept of  manifest error has been confirmed in the jurisprudence of  ECJ under 
the EEC Treaty (now TFEU). The ECJ assumes that where an EU institution is granted 
significant discretion to assess economic conditions in which it formulates or applies 
economic policy measures, the courts, when examining the lawfulness of  the exercise 
of  such freedom, cannot substitute their own evaluation of  the matter for that of  the 
competent authority. In such cases, they must restrict themselves to examining whether 
the evaluation of  the competent authority contains a patent error or constitutes a misuse 
of  power60.
The classic English doctrine of  irrationality plays a similar role. In a strict, substan-
tive sense, according to Lord Green’s classic approach, a decision is irrational when 
it is so absurd “(…) that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of  the 
authority” 61. In the later formulation of  this approach by Lord Diplock, a decision can 
be described as irrational, when is “(…) so outrageous in its defiance of  logic or of  accepted 
moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could 
have derived at it” 62. In this sense, the irrationality test describes the outermost, final 
limit of  discretionary powers, the authority is not allowed to exceed63. The jurispru-
dence holds the view that the decision is “irrational” when it is “perverse”64, “manifestly 
absurdly”65 or “So wrong that no reasonable person could sensibly take that view”66. In contem-
porary approaches, the criterion of  rationality of  the exercise of  discretionary powers 
includes examining whether the decision falls within the range of  reasonable resolutions 
that may be chosen by the author of  the decision67.
60 European Court of  Justice: 14 March 1973, 57/72, Westzucker v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Zucker; 
ECLI:EU:C:1973:30, § 14. Similarly ECJ in Judgement of  25 January 1979 (98/78, A. Racke v Hauptzollamt 
Mainz, ECLI:EU:C:1979:14, § 5): “[…] since the evaluation of  a complex economic situation is involved, the Com-
mission enjoy, in this respect, a wide measure of  discretion. In reviewing the legality of  the exercise of  such discretion, the 
Court must examine whether it contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of  power or whether the authority did not 
clearly exceed the bounds of  its discretion”.
61 Court of  Appeal: 10 November 1947, Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, 
[1948] 1 KB 223.
62 Lord Diplock in: House of  Lords: 22 November 1984, Council of  Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil 
Service, [1985] 1 AC 374.
63 CRAIG, 2012, op. cit., p. 562; BRINKTRINE, op. cit., p. 393.
64 Lord Ackner in: House of  Lords: 7 February 1991, R. v. Secretary of  State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Brind, [1991] 1 AC 696.
65 Lord Bridge of  Harwich in: Court of  Appeal: 4 October 1990, Secretary of  State for the Environment, ex parte 
Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council; 3 All E.R. 589 (614).
66 Lord Denning in: House of  Lords: 21 October 1976, Secretary of  State for Education and Science v. Tameside 
Metropolitan Borough Council, [1977] AC 1014.
67 WOOLF, JOWELL, Le SUEUR, op. cit., p. 545; CRAIG, 2012, op. cit., p. 563.
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4 Abuse of  power and proportionality
As mentioned above, the effect of  displacement of  the classic concept of  abuse 
of  powers by the principle of  proportionality can be noticed in the administrative courts’ 
case law regarding the judicial review of  discretionary powers.
The European legal culture employs a three-element formula of  proportionality, 
which stemmed from the German case law and constitutional doctrine (Grundsatz der 
Verhältnissmäβigkeit)68, and these elements are: suitability, necessity and proportionality 
in a strict sense. Suitability means that measures that actually serve to pursue the objec-
tive should be chosen. Necessity means choosing the measure that least interferes with 
the legally protected sphere of  an individual, but allows to achieve fully the intended 
objective. Proportionality in a strict sense is the balancing of  goods and interests, the 
need to prove that under the circumstances of  the case the public interest is more valu-
able than the private interest.
There are two „converging points” between the principle of  proportionality and the 
concept of  abuse of  power.
The first concerns the element of  suitability. The relationship between the measure and 
the goal in administrative law is special. Any power granted to the authority, especially 
one that grants the possibility of  interference, has its purpose, it is an instrument for the 
implementation of  specific administrative tasks. The administration may not freely set 
objectives of  its action and to select applicable measures. A measure is usually associated 
with a specific goal, especially if  it is of  a strictly imperative nature.
Abuse of  powers consists precisely in the use of  powers (ergo: the measure) for the pur-
pose not provided for by the legislature. This problem can also be approached in terms 
of  the principle of  proportionality: a measure used to achieve an objective not provided 
for by the legislature does not meet the criterion of  suitability. The difference lies in the 
perspective taken. The concept of  abuse of  powers does not undermine the fitness 
of  the measure to achieve the objective intended by the authority. It questions the goal 
itself  in the sense that such link between the measure and the objective intended by the 
authority is not permitted by law. The law binds the powers with a specific objective. 
If  the objectives falls outside the scope of  the powers, this undermines the legality of  all 
the measures applied. Therefore, it can be said that the concept of  abuse of  powers 
questions the authority’s action closer to the „core of  the powers” than the principle 
of  proportionality, which focuses more on the relationship between the methods used 
and the objectives pursued. The concept of  abuse of  powers challenges not only the 
measure, but also the objective chosen by the authority, as an objective not legally related 
to the powers concerned.
68 See the fundamental analysis of  the problem by STĘPKOWSKI, Aleksander. Zasada proporcjonalności 
w europejskiej kulturze prawnej. Warszawa: Liber, 2010, pp. 189–209. ISBN 978-83-72061676.
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An example is the classic judgement of  the French Council of  State of  May 19, 1933, 
in the Benjamin case69. The Council formulated a very important principle, which was 
later repeatedly invoked: in the sphere of  freedom of  assembly, freedom is the rule while 
the police restriction is an exception (la libertéest la règle, la restriction de police l’exception). The 
case concerned a complaint against holding a public conference. The mayor made such 
a decision due to numerous protests by teachers’ trade unions, accusing the organizer 
of  radical criticism of  the education system on the occasion of  such meetings. The 
Council repealed the ban on the assembly, arguing that the threat of  public disorder 
invoked by the mayor was not serious enough to justify a ban on the organization of  the 
assembly, guaranteed by law. The Council referred to the principle of  proportionality, 
although with another approach in the case it was possible to apply the construction 
of  the prohibition of  abuse of  rights. The reason for banning the assembly by the mayor 
was essentially to take into account the demands of  teachers accusing the organizers 
of  denouncing the educational system, not the threat to public order. The mayor used 
therefore his competence in the field of  administrative police for a purpose other than 
provided for by the legislator, and this is a classic abuse of  powers.
In brief: in the case of  abuse of  powers, the intended objective of  the act is itself  unlaw-
ful (an objective which is different from the one for which the authority was granted 
the powers) while pursuing a right objective using wrong means is subject to the review 
of  proportionality70.
The second surface of  contact is already less precise, it concerns the „core of  propor-
tionality”, which is the balancing of  values and interests. Especially in more general for-
mulas of  abuse of  powers (such as in the English concepts), references arise as to axi-
ological shortcomings, failure to take into account all relevant circumstances and the 
lack of  their proper balance. In more precise concepts, these issues do not fall within 
the concept of  abuse of  discretion, but rather they are classified as errors resulting from 
a breach of  the margin of  appreciation (marge d’appréciation). However, if  a more general 
formula is adopted, the criteria of  abuse of  powers and proportionality overlap.
Above mentioned certain marginalization of  the traditional concept of  abuse of  powers 
is evident with respect to the classical French construct of  détournement de pouvoir, and the 
effect of  displacement of  the classic concept abuse of  power by the principle of  pro-
portionality is also noticeable in the judicial review of  acts of  EU institutions.
As explained above, this results from the difficulty in demonstrating the evidence for 
abuse of  power, resulting in that this charge is rarely admitted by the EU courts. This 
creates a kind of  feedback: the difficulties make the complainants to choose other 
69 Available from: http://www.conseil-etat.fr/Decisions-Avis-Publications/Decisions/Les-decisions-les 
-plus-importantes-du-Conseil-d-Etat/19-mai-1933-Benjamin
70 Similarly: CRAIG, de BURCÁ, op. cit., pp. 536–537; EMILIOU, Nicholas. The Principle of  Proportionality 
in European Law. London: Kluwer Law Int., 1996, p. 191. ISBN 978-9041108661.
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charges, in particular violation of  proportionality, and this results in a smaller num-
ber of  cases in which the charge of  abuse of  power was considered by the court at all. 
Another reason for diminishing the practical role of  the concept of  abuse of  power 
is also the fact that this ground of  complaint requires an in-depth review of  the legality 
of  action of  the body, because it deals with a situation of  particularly deeply underlying 
irregularities. For this reason, the analysis of  this error usually appears at the end of  the 
judge’s reasoning, who rather decides to annul the act based on other grounds. This leads 
to the gradual displacement of  the criterion of  abuse of  power by other review criteria, 
including proportionality71. As a result, the charge of  abuse of  power loses its indepen-
dent character, becoming in fact a rhetorical element used in a complaint or grounds 
of  the judgement, rather than a separate legal construct72.
Some authors, therefore, claim that in the review of  discretionary powers of  EU bodies, 
the EU courts case-law has evolved from abuse of  power to the protection of  funda-
mental rights and respectively the principle of  proportionality related73.
A likewise phenomenon is seen in the English model of  judicial review of  discretio-
nary powers. Despite the initial restraint by the judiciary, the principle of  proportionality 
became, with time, one of  cornerstones of  the review of  discretionary power of  public 
administration. Some authors claim that the increase in the significance of  the pro-
portionality criterion may lead to eradication of  the classical doctrine of  irrationality74. 
However, this does not mean a transition to the merits review, but rather a stress on the 
“culture of  justification” that obliges the author of  the decision to consider the rela-
tion between measures and objectives. Courts require a more elaborate substantiation 
of  the decision, but the merits of  the decision will remain within the responsibility 
of  the original author of  the decision (administrative body). The responsibility of  the 
author of  the decision will be to indicate the factors taken into account and to explain 
why one of  them were given priority to others. The court’s to ensure adequate justifi-
cation of  decisions falls within the limits of  their institutional capacity and is the task 
to which they are best suited75.
71 CLEVER, op. cit., p. 118; Van RAEPENBUSCH, op. cit. pp. 509–510.
72 CLEVER, op. cit., pp. 158, 175. These arguments are affirmed by the judgement in the case Crispoltoni 
(ECJ: 5 October 1994, C-133/93, C-300/93 & C-362/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:364), wherein the Court sta-
ted that the appellant’s arguments were based on the assumption, that misuse of  powers may consist 
in the manifest unsuitability of  a measure to the objective pursued, which means that it is necessary 
to examine the allegations in terms of  the principle of  proportionality (§ 35).
73 STĘPKOWSKI, op. cit., pp. 232–239.
74 WADE, FORSYTH, op. cit., pp. 371–372.
75 WOOLF, JOWELL, Le SUEUR. op. cit., p. 598.
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5 The legality and suitability as the criteria for the judicial 
review in the event of  abuse of  discretionary powers
If  abuse of  discretionary powers means using it contrary to the purpose for which the 
legislature granted the authority with this type of  powers, the key problem of  separation 
of  the criterion of  legality and suitability appears. The abuse of  discretionary powers 
approaches both these criteria in a unique way: legality is determined by a teleological 
interpretation of  the power-granting provision. Thus, the following problem arises: how 
to distinguish suitability which is the legal determinant of  the use of  discretion by the 
authority from the suitability beyond the sphere of  legality in a given situation.
The significance of  the problem becomes particularly evident if  we consider that all 
concepts of  abuse of  discretion were developed as an instrument of  judicial review 
of  public administration. Since the judicial review employs the criterion of  lawfulness 
of  the act, errors in the use of  discretionary powers must constitute a violation of  the 
legal norm. However, this does not solve the fundamental problems, because the ques-
tion arises whether, and to what extent, there is a legal obligation to act in accordance 
with the criterion of  suitability (Rechtspflicht zur Zweckmäβigkeit). To the extent that such 
a legal obligation exists, the inconsistency of  the action with its objective will inevitably 
be a violation of  the law also.
When analysing the problem of  general obligation of  the state to act purposefully, Rob-
ert Alexy points out that the content of  such an obligation is the requirement to use only 
appropriate, necessary and properly balanced means (geeignete, erforderliche und richtig abge-
wogene Mittel). The point is, to what extent the implementation of  this type of  obligation 
is “judicially verifiable” (gerichtlich kontrollierbar). There is no doubt that in any democratic 
constitutional state, the obligation of  purposeful action by public authority is something 
more than a mere political or moral duty76.
Due to the fact that legality of  a measure is determined by the adjustment to the needs 
of  the case, which indicates a link with suitability, the discussion arises among scholars 
whether the court only reviews legality, or also suitability.
Some authors argue that, the review of  necessity in any case is not the review of  suit-
abilty. If  the measure is legal only when it is necessary, the authority has no other choice. 
It must use this measure if  it is necessary and cannot use it if  this criterion is not met. 
The judicial review does not cover the question of  suitability77.
However, other scholars of  law argue that the evolution of  judicial review has led 
to a shift in the limits of  suitability and legality of  the act and to the mixing of  these 
76 ALEXY, Robert. Ermessensfehler. Juristenzeitung, 1986, no. 15–16, pp. 705–706.
77 DELVOLVÉ, Pierre. Existe-t-il un contrôle de l’opportunité. In: Conseil constitutionnel et Conseil d’État. 
Paris: L.G.D.J., 1988, p. 294. ISBN 22-75-008268.
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criteria. According to Jean Paul Costa78 the introduction of  the principle of  propor-
tionality allowed the Council of  State to bypass the difficulty self-imposed by it. This 
difficulty results from the principle that the court, as the guardian of  legality, does not 
control the suitability of  administrative decisions.
If  legality is understood as compliance with legal rules (which must be observed by the 
authority), while suitability is understood as fitness to the circumstances in which the 
decision was issued, in some cases the court simultaneously reviews both the legality and 
opportunity of  the decision, i.e. its legality and its fitness to facts (adaptation aux faits). 
This is illustrated by examples of  judgements in cases of  administrative police. A mea-
sure is lawful only if  it is proportional to the violation of  public order, in other words: 
when it is respective to this violation. This is the definition of  suitability. This applies 
also to the review of  the use of  discretionary powers by the administration. An exam-
ple can be, referred to above, the classic judgement of  the French Council of  State 
in case Benjamin, in which it was considered that the prohibition to hold a public assem-
bly is a disproportionate measure, because in reality there was no actual threat to public 
order. Looking at the body’s motivation, the case involved an abuse of  powers, as the 
mayor used a police measure (prohibition of  assemblies) under the influence of  trade 
union protests and, therefore, against the purpose of  the conferred powers.
The interchangeability of  review criteria, dictated by the need to find a suitable means 
of  protection of  an individual against arbitrariness of  public administration, even at the 
expense of  “dogmatic purity” and transparency of  theoretical classifications, is also vis-
ible in the case law of  English courts. The confirmation is Lord Templeman’s argumenta-
tion in the case R. v. Inland Revenue Commission, ex parte Preston79:
“In most cases in which the court has granted judicial review on grounds of  „unfairness” amounting 
to abuse of  power there has been some proven element of  improper motive. (…) when they abused 
their powers by exercising or declining to exercise those powers in order to achieve objectives which 
were not the objectives for which the powers had been conferred”
This tendency to enhance control is worth preserving, as long as it allows the administra-
tive court to play a full role as a defender of  individuals, ensuring the compliance with 
standards of  good administration80.
The key issue is to understand the fundamental principle that the role of  the court is not 
to substitute the administration with regard to the merits of  decisions.
78 COSTA, Jean-Paul. Le principe de proportionnalité dans la jurisprudence du Conseil d’État. Actualite 
Juridique: Droit Administratif, 1988, p. 434.
79 1985 A.C. 835 (864).
80 SERRAND, op. cit., pp. 921–923. Similarly in Belgian literature: BATSELE, MORTIER, SCARCEZ, op. 
cit., p. 717.
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An example of  this may be the argumentation of  Judge Laws in the case Somerset County 
Council, ex parte Fewings81. Trying to explain the essence of  judicial review, Judge Laws 
stated:
“It is that, in most cases, the judicial review court is not concerned with the merits of  the decision 
under review. The court does not ask itself  the question „Is this decision right or wrong?” Far less 
does the judge ask himself  whether he would himself  arrived at the decision in question. […] The 
only question for the judge is whether the decision taken by the body under review was one which 
it was legally permitted to take in the way it did”.
A likewise example is Lord Donaldson’s discourse in the case Secretary of  State for the Envi-
ronment, ex parte Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council82:
“The role of  the judiciary is essentaily that of  a referee (…) the moves made by the players and 
the tactics employed by the teams are matters entirely for them. The referee is only involved when 
it appears that some player has acted in breach of  the rules. The referee may then stop the play and 
take soem remedia action but, tempting though it may be it, it is not for him to express any view 
on the skill of  the players or how he would have acted in their position. Still less, following a breach 
of  the rules, does he take over the position of  one of  the players. So too with the judiciary (…)”.
The above efforts to justify and explain the essence of  judicial review of  discretionary 
power is supported by the concept of  “judicial self-restraint” and the accompanying 
question of  “unreviewable discretion”. Courts try to be moderate in matters related 
to the implementation of  administrative policy in certain “sensitive” areas (such as immi-
gration law), to avoid being accused of  forcing their own “policy”83. Therefore, courts 
are trying to adjust the intensity of  review of  discretionary powers to the character 
of  a particular situation, so as not to excessively reduce the role of  the administration 
in shaping and achieving objectives assumed.
The area where judicial self-restraint is seen is the issue of  appropriate allocation of  li-
mited public funds, such as health services financed from public funds. Limited re-
sources may lead to the need to make dramatic choices as part of  the exercise of  dis-
cretionary powers. An example of  this may be the case R. v. Cambridge Health Authority 
ex. p. B.84, in which the authority refused to finance a costly experimental therapy for 
a child suffering from leukemia, yet with a small chance for the success. The refusal 
was justified on the one hand by the nature of  the therapy, which cannot be considered 
81 High Court (Queens Bench Division): 10 February 1994, [1995] 1 All ER 513.
82 Court of  Appeal: 4 October 1990, 3 All E.R. 589 (614).
83 BRINKTRINE, op. cit., p. 344. See also a statement by Judge Lawton in Case Laker Airways v. Department 
of  Trade (Court of  Appeal: 15. 12. 1976; [1977] Q.B. 643): “(…) Judges have nothing to do with either policy 
making or the carrying out of  policy. Their function is to decide wheter a minister has acted within the powers given him 
by statute or common law”.
84 Court of  Appeal: 10 March 1995, [1995] 1 WLR 898.
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as the best possible solution in the interest of  the child, on the other hand by the limi-
ted financial resources. The dramatic character of  the case is well illustrated by Lord 
Bingham’s statement:
“I have no doubt that in a perfect world any treatment which a patient, or a patient’s family, sought 
would be provided if  doctors were willing to give it, no matter how much it costs, particularly when 
a life was potentially at stake. It would however, in my view, be shutting one’s eyes to the real world 
if  the court were to proceed on the basis that we do live in such a world. It is common knowledge 
that health authorities of  all kinds are constantly pressed to make ends meet. They cannot pay their 
nurses as much as they would like; they cannot provide all the treatments they would like; they can-
not purchase all the extremely expensive medical equipment they would like; they cannot carry out 
all the research they would like; they cannot build all the hospitals and specialist units they would 
like. Difficult and agonising judgments have to be made as to how a limited budget is best allocated 
to the maximum advantage of  the maximum number of  patients. That is not a judgment which the 
court can make. In my judgment, it is not something that a health authority such as this authority 
can be fairly criticised for not advancing before the court”.
Conclusions. The future of  the concept
When analysing the case law regarding the review of  the exercise of  discretionary 
powers, it is evident that the classic concept of  abuse of  powers has clearly lost its sig-
nificance. Although it is still referred to in administrative law handbooks by scholars, 
it appears less and less frequently in the case law. At the same time, many authors note 
that, while applicants with persevering “enthusiasm” invoke charges of  abuse of  power, 
the courts are less and less concerned about these charges. The reasons for this phenom-
enon can be seen in the nature of  the classically conceived concept of  abuse of  powers, 
which requires the assessment of  intentional elements of  the authority’s action. On the 
one hand, this causes evidence finding difficulties, and on the other, it makes it difficult 
to formulate objectively verifiable arguments in a legal dispute regarding the legality 
of  the act. As a result of  these factors, the construct of  abuse of  power is superseded 
by other grounds of  complaint that allow for the same effect of  repealing the act, but are 
based on more transparent and objectively perceptible criteria (in particular the principle 
of  proportionality or the concept of  manifest error in assessment).
The evolution of  the case-law has reduced the practical meaning of  the classical concept 
of  abuse of  discretionary powers (detournement de pouvoir, Ermessensmissbrauch), although 
it did not undermine its theoretical basis. Simply, the courts, as well as the complain-
ants, are less eager to use this concept, considering the instrument to be more diffi-
cult to apply and giving far less certain effects in the form of  repealing a defective act. 
It is therefore not a change of  dogmatic nature, but rather of  practical nature. The theo-
retical foundations of  classic concepts retain their value, although they have lost their 
practical significance.
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Despite the declining practical significance, the concept of  abuse of  powers remains 
an ultima ratio means to challenge administrative acts that are unacceptable from the 
point of  view of  the axiology of  the legal system, the “ultimate weapon” of  an admi-
nistrative court judge. The value of  this concept is also expressed in emphasizing the 
importance of  the competence norms. Without denying the need for a restrictive inter-
pretation of  competence provisions, it must be recognized that each power of  an admi-
nistrative body has its own specific purpose. The use of  powers for purposes other than 
that for which they were originally intended leads to an unacceptable restriction of  the 
rights of  the individual. A reference to the search for the purpose of  the powers, charac-
teristic of  the concept of  abuse of  powers, does not blur the limits of  interference, but 
on the contrary: allows them to be given a rational sense.
It should be noted that the prohibition of  abuse of  power under the European soft law 
is still one of  the basic standards for exercising powers by a public administration body 
and one of  the basic criteria for judicial review of  public administration (art. 7 of  the 
European Code of  Good Administrative Behavior; Recommendation No. R (80)2 of  the 
Committee of  Ministers Concerning the Exercise of  Discretionary Powers by Admi-
nistrative Authorities85, Recommendation Rec(2004)20 of  the Committee of  Ministers 
to member states on judicial review of  administrative acts86).
85 Among basic principles applicable to the exercise of  discretionary powers by administrative authorities, 
the recommendation points to the principle of  reasonableness: An administrative authority, when exer-
cising a discretionary power: 1. does not pursue a purpose other than that for which the power has been 
conferred (II.1).
86 According to the point 1.b, reffering to the scope of  judicial review: “The tribunal should be able to review any 
violation of  the law, including lack of  competence, procedural impropriety and abuse of  power”.
